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Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Will Criticism of
SOX Undermine Its Benefits?
Cheryl L. Wade*

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 1 ("SOX" or the "Act") not only
changed the details relating to financial reporting, internal controls, and
corporate governance in general, but also changed the discussion about
corporate climates and cultures, at least temporarily. The political
discourse leading up to SOX's enactment in the aftermath of the
accounting debacles of 2001 and 2002 was replete with discussions
about more ethical and responsible corporate governance. The Act's
passage, accompanied by the get-tough-on-Corporate-America speeches
made by President George W. Bush and others 2 changed the way
corporate actors discuss their ethical obligations. The Act's strict
requirements regarding financial disclosure and accounting inspired a
climate in which discussions about corporate ethics moved from the
3
periphery of corporate discourse to the center of corporate discourse.
Five years after its enactment, however, the business community's
criticism of SOX is almost virulent. An examination of some of the
post-2002 discourse about SOX within the business community reveals
that most of the business community has deemed SOX illegitimate.
According to a survey described in CFO magazine, ninety-four percent
of executives from 217 companies surveyed in 2005 felt that the cost of

* Dean Harold F. McNiece Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.) (Supp. 2006).
2. John D. McKinnon & Christopher Conkey, Politics & Economics: Bush Gives Hope to
Foes of Sarbanes-Oxley Law; PresidentOffers Political Cover for Easing Burden on Business,
But Joins Executive-Pay Critics, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2007, at A4.
3. For example, the Act requires disclosure about a code of conduct for senior officers, and the
"internal controls requirements ... force both lawyers and auditors to investigate the firm's
ethical climate along with legal compliance." Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between
Philosophy and Economics: Legitimacy and Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1615, 1621 (2006).
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compliance outweighed the benefits of SOX. 4 Another study revealed
that more than'5 half of directors in the Americas want SOX repealed or
"overhauled." Seventy-two percent of directors surveyed in the
Americas said SOX made them too cautious, and consequently they are
"not taking the necessary risks to drive growth." 6 Fifty-nine percent of
directors surveyed in the Americas have declined a board position due7
to the risk associated with failure to adequately comply with SOX.
Academics and business people assert that some of the Act's most8
significant provisions provide little or no protection for investors.
Commentators lament the high costs imposed on businesses to comply
with SOX. 9
Five years after its enactment, regulators acknowledged that the value
of SOX is found in the principles on which it is based.10 Recognizing
that the underlying principles of the Act are as important as the details
relating to specific corporate governance changes, regulators,
attempting to reduce unnecessary costs, provided guidance in 2007
intended to change the interpretation and implementation of SOX's
most controversial provision, Section 404.11 Section 404 requires
managers to install and assess internal controls designed to lower the
risk that financial statements will contain material misstatements or
omissions. 12 The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission") and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board

4. Chris Morrison, Challenging the Validity of Sarbanes-Oxley Pt. 1,FINANCIALWIRE (Feb.
2, 2007), http://www.investrend.com/articles/article.aspanalystld=0&id=44365&topicld=160
&level= 160.
5. Press Release, Kom/Ferry Int'l, Majority of Board of Directors Feel Sarbanes-Oxley
Regulations Should be Repealed or Overhauled (Feb. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Press Release,
Korn/Ferry], http://www.kornferry.com/Library/Process.asp?P=PR Detail&CID= 1419&LID=1.
The study found that fifty-eight percent of board directors surveyed felt regulations served only to
make boards overly cautious and the laws should be repealed or overhauled. Id. The study is
"[t]he most comprehensive, longest-running survey of its kind in the world .... [It] examines
opinions and practices found in boardrooms of major corporations throughout the world." Id.
6.

Chris Evans, Directors Call for Sarbanes-Oxley Repeal, Accountancy Age (Feb. 23, 2006),

http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/2150885/sarbanes-story.
7. Press Release, Korn/Ferry, supra note 5; Evans, supra note 6.
8. See infra Part IV (exploring the changing discourse surrounding SOX, which is becoming
overwhelmingly critical).
9. See Morrison, supra note 4 (discussing the argument that dollar amounts involved in
compliance outweigh its benefits).
10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act Fifth Anniversary (C-Span television broadcast July 30, 2007),

available at http://www.c-spanarchives.org/library/index.php?main-page=product-video-info
&products.id=200222- 1&highlight=sarbanes.
11. See infra Part III (discussing the SEC's revised interpretation of SOX compliance as more
principle-based as opposed to a check-the-box type of compliance).
12. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. 2006)).
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("PCAOB") advised managers and auditors to undertake an approach
that focuses on the principle of risk assessment. 13 This principles-based
approach should replace the detail oriented "compliance-by-checklist"
approach that some managers have taken when complying with SOX.14
This Article addresses four basic questions. First, what is the impact
of the business community's attack on the legitimacy of SOX? Second,
what will be the nature of corporate compliance with a law that is
deemed illegitimate by so many to whom the law applies? Third, will
the business community's disdain for the Act erode the substance of the
Act? Finally, will business people who conclude that SOX is
illegitimate ignore the principles on which the Act is based and continue
to place form over substance when they comply?
SOX changed some of the details of corporate governance, but it also
took aim at unprincipled, unethical conduct. The focus of this essay is
not on the details of the critiques of the Act, but on the way the
discourse is unfolding today. The tone of that discourse may undermine
one of the Act's fundamental principles: ethical and diligent
compliance. Managers and auditors have become mired in the minutiae
of SOX compliance.
Because most members of the business
community question the efficacy and legitimacy of SOX, they seem to
engage in "compliance-by-checklist," checking off the details related to
complying with SOX while ignoring the broad principles of ethical
compliance and diligent monitoring. These fundamental principles get
lost in the compliance-by-checklist approach that results from the
business community's criticism of SOX and conclusions about its value
and the legitimacy of compliance. The Act's most salient goal is to
increase investor confidence, 15 but the "'compliance by checklist' mode
with respect to disclosure and corporate governance . . . may provide
[even though] it is
assurance that a company is following the rules,
16
debatable whether investors are better off for it."

13. See infra Part VI (exploring the principles-based approach to section 404).
14. Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of "Principles-Based
Systems" in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411
(2007) (arguing that the term "principles-based" is misleading and is used in an attempt to inspire
ethical compliance with corporate law, and securities and accounting regulations).
15. Louis M. Thompson, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley Means Opportunities and Challenges for
Companies and IROs, CPA J. (Sept. 2005), http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/2005/
905/perspectives/pl4.htm; see also Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some
Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
671 (2002) (observing that SOX duplicates existing law, regulation, and standards).
16. Thompson, supra note 15.
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II. DOES GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REQUIRE REGULATING
UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR?

Recently, the New York Times printed an editorial featuring the
following statement in bold print: "Being against insider trading is like
being against sin .... Like most sins, it principally offends those who
don't or can't indulge. . . . And like most sins, it shouldn't be a
crime. ' ' 17 The author of the editorial discussed recent allegations that
insiders at various companies made millions from trading on material
nonpublic information.1 8 He argued that:
[I]nsider trading is so common that the only way the Securities and
Exchange Commission can enforce laws against it is selectively, much
as a patrolman tickets only the red sports car when everyone on the
road is speeding ... [S]topping the sports car slows traffic only for a
mile or two. It gives the false impression that the policeman
is on the
19
beat, making the financial markets safe for the rest of us.
At one point in the editorial, the author boldly proclaimed, "I'm an
expert on this issue." 20 Although this may seem immodest, the next line
read, "I was convicted of using advance knowledge of the content of my
columns for The Wall Street Journal to make money in the stock
market. '2 1 The author was R. Foster Winans, the defendant in an
22
important and infamous insider trading case.
The editorial relates to three important points about corporate
governance in general and SOX in particular. First, it is very difficult
for academics, policymakers, lawyers, politicians, legislators, and
regulators to agree about what constitutes good corporate regulation and
governance. For example, Winans and many commentators before him
have convincingly argued that legislators and regulators should "[t]hrow
out the current insider trading laws .... "23 There are, however, equally
convincing arguments that support the ban on insider trading.
Similarly, with respect to many corporate governance practices, there
are convincing arguments that a particular practice is good, and there
17. R. Foster Winans, Editorial, Let Everyone Use What Wall Street Knows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.

13, 2007, at A 19.
18. Id. ("Earlier... we heard that a band of Wall Streeters pocketed $14 million in allegedly
illegal profits based on inside information, and that unnamed traders have made more than $5
million knowing ahead of time about a buyout offer for Texas Utilities.").
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.

22. Id. See Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19, 29 (1987) (finding that "Winans continued in the
employ of the Journal, appropriating its confidential business information for his own use, all the
while pretending to perform his duty of safeguarding it").
23. Winans, supra note 17, at A19.
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are equally convincing arguments that the same practice fails to enhance
This is vividly 24illustrated by
firm performance or governance.
key provisions.
SOX's
of
some
to
disagreements relating
Secondly, Winans pointed out that the public will not know when
laws fail to do what they claim to do. 25 Investors are likely to believe
that even ineffective laws will protect them when, in actuality, they do
not. This creates a false sense of safety among investors and the general
public. At the time of its enactment, SOX embodied a national
sentiment that was a political and practical reaction to the public's
discontent with the Enron, WorldCom, and other governance and
accounting scandals of 2001 and 2002.26 To say that the public's
reaction to SOX in 2002 was favorable would be an understatement.
According to one report, "investors cheered the law during its early
days ...[S]tock market values increased significantly as a result of the
reforms imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act . . . . [I]t has restored
confidence in a market that was battered by a 27six-month long string of
corporate scandals from Enron to WorldCom."
Paradoxically, the companies that were most aggressive in
manipulating earnings were the companies that benefited the most from
The stock of those companies rebounded because the
SOX. 28
enactment of SOX made investors believe that firms would no longer
fraudulently manipulate financial information. 2 9 Because of SOX,
30
investors believed the information they received was more reliable.
24. See infra Part Ill (discussing the debate over whether SOX's prohibitions against insider
trading are warranted or desirable).
25. Winans, supra note 17, at A19 (arguing that arbitrary enforcement, such as stopping only
red sports cars for speeding violations when everyone is speeding, gives the false impression of
safety).
26. See, e.g., Chris Morrison, Challenging the Validity of Sarbanes-Oxley Pt. 3,
FINANCIALWIRE (Feb. 13, 2007), http://www.investrend.com/articles/article.asp?analystld
=0&id=45723&topicld=160&level=160 (observing that politicians enacted SOX in response to
public resentment after the Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco scandals); Chris Morrison, Challenging
the Validity of Sarbanes-Oxley Pt. 2, FINANCIALWIRE (Feb. 7, 2007), http://www.investrend
(stating that SOX
.com/articles/article.asp?analystld=O&id=44965&topicld=160&level=160
came "into effect during a period of high anti-corporate sentiment in the public").
27. University of Iowa News Release, UI Researchers Find Positive Reaction to Sarbanes2007)
http://news-releases.uiowa.edu/2007/february/O22007sox(Feb. 20,
Oxley Act
reaction.html [hereinafter University of Iowa News Release].
28. Id. Researchers studied "a sub-set of 425 companies that were seen as using aggressive
accounting tactics prior to SOX and their value increased by an additional 5 percent during the
study period." Id. The news release acknowledges that the rise could likely be explained by the
fact that their stock prices had been driven low by post-Enron consumer doubts. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (examining how the stock market drops amidst the revelation of fraudulent accounting
behavior, but rises and rebounds with news of government action and enforcement).
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Though SOX seems to have restored investor confidence, some
research suggests that this confidence may not be warranted. 3 1 For
example, SOX requires that each member of an audit committee be
independent. 32
Empirical studies, however, fail to establish
conclusively that an audit committee comprised entirely of independent
directors actually enhances a company's performance. 33 It is unclear
whether an audit committee composed of only independent directors
will reduce accounting irregularities; thus, post-SOX audit committees
34
may not deserve increased investor confidence.
The third point the Winans editorial makes is the focus of this essay.
Winans claims that insider trading is a sin, but not a crime. How does
this notion play out under SOX? There is considerable disagreement
about whether SOX enhances firm performance, improves the quality of
financial disclosures, or provides investor protection. 3 5 Will the debate
about SOX's usefulness lead some corporate agents to conclude that
mere cosmetic compliance with SOX is a sin rather than a crime? What
about civil liability under SOX? Will business people who have
concluded that SOX should be repealed or rolled back deem cosmetic
compliance, or compliance-by-checklist, with SOX's civil provisions a
legitimate approach? Will business leaders consider such an approach
ethical because they have concluded that SOX should not have been
enacted?

31. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing empirical studies which suggest
that independent audit committees have no effect on the reduction of accounting irregularities).
32. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. 2006))
33. Peter J. Wallison, Will Independent Directors Produce Good Corporate Governance, in
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH (January 6, 2006), available

at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubiD.23648,filter.alllpub-detail.asp;

P. Krishna Prasanna,

Corporate Governance-Independent Directors and Financial Performance: An Empirical
Analysis, INDIAN INST. OF CAP. MARKETS 9TH CAPITAL MARKETS CONFERENCE PAPER,

availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=877807.
34. Wallison, supra note 33, at 2 (noting that the benefits to a supermajority of independent
directors are theoretical because the empirical evidence at best is ambiguous). Yet another level
of ambiguity is added when there is disagreement about how to define independence. Cf Eric M.
Fogel & Andrew M. Geier, Strangers in the House: Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the

Independent Board of Directors,32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 47-48 (2007) (illustrating the difficulty
of defining independence by showing that the definitions articulated by stock exchanges and other
regulatory agencies have been both over inclusive and under inclusive).
35. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (examining the debate surrounding the
empirical support for SOX).
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THE DEBATE ABOUT SOX AND THE MEANING OF GOOD CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE

This Section will focus on the debate and disagreement over what
makes for good corporate governance in general, and more specifically,
whether the corporate governance changes enacted under SOX are
worthwhile.
Some commentators complain that SOX's corporate governance
provisions fail to address the problems that caused the spectacular
accounting debacles in 2001 and 2002.36 They claim that the Act
focuses "on minor issues such as who has access to office keys, while
37
placing insufficient emphasis on who has access to financial records.*"
Some of these commentators conclude that SOX will not protect
investors from corporate fraud in the future, relying on empirical studies
which suggest that some of the corporate governance changes under the
38
Act will not deter fraudulent financial reporting.
Professor Roberta Romano explains that the corporate governance
provisions of the Act were enacted without congressional consideration
of empirical studies claiming that the changes would not improve firm
performance or enhance the quality of audits. 39 Romano advocates for
the rescission of SOX's corporate governance changes, "either by
transforming them into statutory defaults that apply to firms at their
option or by removing them completely and redirecting jurisdictional
40
authority to the states."
According to much of the relevant empirical evidence, Romano
argues, there is no meaningful connection between some of the Act's
most significant sections and improved firm performance or reduced
accounting impropriety. 4 1 For example, SOX's Section 301 requires
42
that all members of public company audit committees be independent.
At least intuitively, it would seem that audit committee members with
no financial ties beyond director fees with the companies they
36. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate

Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) ("SOX was enacted in a flurry of congressional
activity.., after the spectacular failures of the once highly regarded firms Enron and WorldCom.
• . . But many of the substantive corporate governance provisions of SOX are not in fact
regulatory innovations devised by Congress to cope with deficiencies in the business environment
in which Enron and WorldCom failed."); McKinnon & Conkey, supra note 2, at A4 (describing
President Bush's statements that SOX has been a success but excesses should be rolled back).
37. McKinnon & Conkey, supra note 2, at A4.
38. Romano, supra note 36, at 1529.
39. Id. at 1523.
40. Id. at 1602.
41. Id. at 1529.
42. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. 2006)).
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investigate would be the most effective monitors of that company's
managers. However, Romano states that "[t]he literature on the
composition of audit committees does not support the proposition that
requiring audit committees to consist solely of independent directors
will reduce the probability of financial statement wrongdoing or
43
otherwise improve corporate performance."
The results of empirical studies relating to several of SOX's other
provisions yield similar results. 4 4 SOX's Section 201 prohibits auditors
from providing non-auditing services to the firms for which they serve
as accountants. 45 Romano states that:
The rationale for the ban was that the receipt of high fees for nonaudit
services compromises auditor independence by providing auditors
with a financial incentive to permit managers to engage in
questionable transactions. . . .The overwhelming majority of the
studies (nineteen out of twenty-five) suggest that SOX's prohibition of
the purchase of nonaudit services from
an auditor is an exercise in
46
legislating away a [sic] audit quality.
Furthermore, fifteen of the twenty-five studies conclude that there is
no connection between the provision of nonaudit services and audit
47
quality.
A similar argument can be made with respect to Section 402(a) and
Section 302. Section 402(a) prohibits public companies that are not
financial institutions from making loans to executives. 48 This Section
of SOX was enacted to avoid obvious conflicts between the interests of
executives and the interests of the firms for which they work.4 9
However, empirical research suggests that executives increase their
equity investment in their firm after obtaining firm loans. 50 These
equity purchases help to align the executives' interests with those of the
firm and its shareholders. 5 1 Therefore, observers disagree about the
efficacy of 402(a) as a measure that protects investors. 52 Additionally,
under Section 302, chief executives and chief financial officers must
43. Romano, supra note 36, at 1533.
44. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing studies which concluded that
SOX has had no effect on audit quality).
45. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j- (g) (Supp. 2006)).
46. Romano, supra note 36, at 1533-36.
47. Id. at 1536.
48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp. 2006)) (prohibiting
personal loans to executives).
49. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402 (entitled "Enhanced conflict of interest provisions").
50. Romano, supra note 36, at 1539.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1540 (calling the SOX legislation a "blunderbuss" approach).
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attest to the accuracy of their firm's financial statements, but empirical
provides
research results conflict about whether executive 5certification
3
benefit.
or
information
tangible
investors with any
SOX does not require that a majority of the directors who serve on a
public company's board be independent, but the New York Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ do impose this requirement. 54 There is
disagreement over the idea that a "supermajority independent board of
directors is the ideal corporate governance structure." 55 It seems like a
good idea for a board, which monitors management, to be comprised of
independent directors with no ties to the company or its management.
Others, however, worry that the costs of increased independence will be
inefficiently exorbitant when independent directors who are not
intimately familiar with the company must gather information. 56 In any
event, empirical research conducted by several scholars has failed to
number of
establish a connection between boards with a large
57
wealth.
shareholder
increased
and
directors
independent
Because there is extensive debate about the utility of the corporate
governance changes required under SOX, the details of the Act's
provisions seem less important. The Act's underlying principles, rather
than specific corporate governance changes, provide business leaders
with the guidance they need. Yet the debate about the utility of SOX's
corporate governance changes is likely to eclipse the importance of the
Act's underlying principles. Business leaders comply with the details
and minutiae, and the letter of the law, in order to avoid liability while
ignoring the Act's principles. Moreover, because of the fervor of the
debate about SOX, business leaders who fail to seriously consider the
Act's principles do not assess their own attitudes as sinful, unlawful or
problematic.

IV.

THE CHANGING DISCOURSE ABOUT SOX

Because of the emerging empirical evidence involving SOX's
effectiveness, today's discourse regarding SOX is dramatically different

53. Id. at 1540-41.
54. See Fogel & Geier, supra note 34, at 35 (describing the New York Stock Exchange and
NASDAQ's rule requiring a majority of directors to be independent).
55. Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishizationof Independence I (U.G.A. Legal Stud. Res.,Working
Paper No. 07-007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=968513.
56. See generally Cheryl L. Wade, What Independent Directors Should Expect from Inside
Directors:Smith v. Van Gorkom as a Guide to Intra-Firm Governance, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 367,
374-76 (2006) (discussing the process of information gathering and the process of sharing
information between independent and inside directors).
57. Fogel & Geier, supra note 34, at 52-56.
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than it was in 2002.58 As noted earlier, the Act was met with little
59
hostility when it was passed due to the 2001 and 2002 scandals.
Today, some regulators, institutional investors and academics continue
to focus on the Act's benefits. 60 There are commentators who argue
that the Act has the potential to prevent corporate fraud, and caution
against rolling back the legislation because of "the steady stream of
corporate fraud revelations" that continue to arise years after SOX's
enactment. 6 1 Other commentators chronicle the improvements in
internal controls, corporate governance, and financial audits as
62
companies comply with SOX.
However, five years after its enactment, most of the discussion

regarding SOX is critical. Many argue that the Act should be repealed
63
because it is an unconstitutional federalization of corporate law.
Others complain that compliance with SOX has made companies that
are listed on U.S. stock exchanges less competitive than companies
listed elsewhere. 64 Some commentators lament the high costs of

58. Compare Scott Harshbarger & Gourtam U. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward:
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L. REV. 1, 7 (2007)
("Indeed, SOX exists and is appropriate for this situation precisely because it imposes baseline
obligations with which corporations are required to comply.") with Romano, supra note 36, at
1594 ("Financial turmoil thus appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the
enactment of market regulation, and the quality of federal legislative decisionmaking . . . has
consistently left much to be desired.").
59. See supra Part III (discussing the atmosphere surrounding creation and passage of the
legislation).
60. Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 58, at 6. Harshbarger and Jois note that institutional
investors' and regulators' continued support of SOX suggests that the Act will not be abolished.
Id.
61. Id. (citing to the "accounting issues at Fannie Mae and options backdating at Apple").
62. See generally Daniel L. Goelzer, Auditing under Sarbanes-Oxley: An Interim Report, 7 J.
Bus. & SEC. L. 1 (2007); Milton Ezrati, Taking a Second Look at SOX, ON WALL STREET, Apr.
1, 2007, available at http://www.onwallstreet.com/asset/article/529371/taking-second-looksox.html?pg= (discussing how companies improved compliance with SOX).
63. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law,
REGULATION, Spring 2003 (arguing that SOX disrupted the traditional regulation of corporation
law by the states).
64. See, e.g., Emma Trincal, Chamber PushesRegulatory Reform, HEDGEWORLD NEWS, Mar.
12, 2007; Robert Schroeder, Regulations, Litigation Criticized at Conference: Sarbanes-Oxley
said to weigh on U.S. Public Companies, MARKETWATCH, Mar. 13, 2007 (reporting on warnings
of New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and New York Senator Charles Schumer of the
decline of New York as a prominent financial center as companies move offshore to avoid
compliance with SOX). Some observe, however, that there are other reasons why the number of
initial public offerings has decreased in U.S. markets and that they are not less competitive
because of SOX. See Goelzer, supra note 62, at 6-7 (arguing that assertions "that [SOX] is
undermining the competitiveness of our markets [are], at best, overstated").
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compliance with certain SOX provisions, 6 5 despite evidence that these
costs are declining. 66 In any event, whether the complaints are valid or
not, most business people today are acutely critical of the Act.
In the years since its passage, academics and members of the business
community have argued convincingly that the substantive corporate
governance changes required by the Act fail to benefit the investing
public because they do not improve corporate performance or the
quality of an audit committee's work. 67 In other words, the corporate
governance provisions do not operate in a way that will prevent the type
of corporate misconduct and oversight failure that precipitated the 2001
and 2002 accounting scandals. Even if the details of the corporate
governance changes are wrongheaded, however, the principles
underlying the legislation should be upheld.
Unfortunately, the
widespread discussion about the failure of the detailed governance
changes may preclude the changes in corporate culture and climate that
the Act's underlying principles were intended to inspire.
V. WILL CRITICISMS OF SOX UNDERMINE ITS BENEFITS?

Notwithstanding the increasing criticism of SOX from members of
the business community and academics, regulators and institutional
investors continue to extol its virtues. 68 The Act, including the much
maligned Section 404, has produced some tangible benefits. One
scholar notes, "the number of companies that disclosed serious chinks in
their internal accounting controls jumped to 586 in the first four months
of 2005, compared with 313 for all of 2004. ",69 Some chief executives
acknowledge that because Section 404 required them to examine the
adequacy of internal controls, they discovered accounting inaccuracies,
acquired a better understanding of how their companies operate, and

65. See infra Part VI (discussing Section 404 of the Act and the arguments surrounding the
high cost of compliance).
66. See Goelzer, supra note 62, at 6 (discussing how SOX costs have declined); Aaron Siegel,
Research shows compliance costs rev up, INVESTMENT NEWS, Mar. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070312/FREE/70309018/1017/IT
OC&ht= (asserting that SOX compliance costs have dropped over the past two years).
67. Romano, supra note 36, at 1530-31.
The existence of a literature that addresses the efficacy of some of the SOX mandates
highlights an even more troubling feature of the legislative process .... The gist of the
literature, that the proposed mandates would not be effective, was available to
legislators while they were formulating SOX. Yet it went unnoticed or was ignored.

Id. at 1526.
68.
69.

Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 58, at 5-6.
Amy Borrus, Learning to Love Sarbanes-Oxley, BUS. WK., Nov. 21, 2005, at 126-28.
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cut costs and be more productive in other aspects of their
were able to
70
businesses.
It is possible, however, that the current discourse about SOX will
reverse or undermine any beneficial impact of the Act. The business
community's criticism of SOX leads many business people to question
its legitimacy. Such organizational challenges to the Act's legitimacy
may result in marginal compliance at best, and perhaps noncompliance
in some instances. In other words, if firms perceive the Act to be
"poorly crafted [and] unduly burdensome," they will not be compelled
71
to comply fully.
If, however, it is true that the Act's corporate governance
requirements do not improve firm performance or audit quality,
marginal compliance or even noncompliance is largely irrelevant. The
failure to comply with rules that will not benefit investors cannot harm
those investors. For example, if the empirical evidence establishes that
having an independent audit committee will not benefit investors by
improving firm performance or audit quality, a company's failure to
comply with this mandate should not harm investors.
It is clear, however, that SOX is not solely concerned with the details
of corporate governance and financial reporting. Responding to the
Act's critics, Representative Oxley emphasized that "the core principles
of Sarbanes-Oxley are paramount, and if changes need to be made in the
way the law is enforced, the regulators have the power to make those
adjustments." 72 The value of SOX lies in the principles underlying the
Act rather than in the Act's corporate governance details. It is at this
point that the discourse questioning the Act's legitimacy becomes most
relevant. Corporate actors who challenge the Act's legitimacy may or
may not comply with the details of the corporate governance mandates.
Furthermore, business leaders who challenge the legitimacy of SOX
may fail to adhere to the underlying principles that inspired the
legislation. This is the real danger of the manner in which the discourse
unfolds among the Act's detractors. Because most business leaders
deem the Act illegitimate, firms may comply only with the details of the
Act's corporate governance rules while ignoring the Act's underlying

70. Id. Some companies were inspired to upgrade their computer systems. Others used "the
paperwork generated [in complying with 404] to describe their internal controls as job-training
manuals." Id. However, Pitney Bowes CFO Bruce Nolop noted that "[t]here's no doubt that 404
goes too far ....You end up documenting things for the sake of documenting them[.]" Id.
71. Paul S. Atkins, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the Financial
Services Roundtable Lawyers Council 2007 Spring Meeting (May 10, 2007).
72. John Cranford, Taking Stock of Accounting Law, CQ WKLY, Mar. 19, 2007, at 790.
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principles, including its goal to inspire a more a ethical way of
disclosing financial information to investors.
VI. THE SEC's NEW PRINCIPLES-BASED

APPROACH TO SECTION

404

Much of the criticism of SOX has focused on Section 404, the most
contentious of the Act's provisions. 7 3 Section 404 requires managers to
create, maintain, and test processes that monitor internal controls over
financial reporting, thereby decreasing the likelihood that financial
statements will contain material inaccuracies. 74 Even though the costs
of complying with Section 404 have decreased in each of the three years
after the provision became effective, the business community complains
vociferously that compliance costs outweigh the benefits provided
under Section 404. 7 5 Business leaders lament that they have far too
little time to spend attending to core business issues because so much
time, money, and effort is spent complying with Section 404.76 They
express concern that the time and effort invested in complying with the
internal control and reporting requirements reduce the type of
innovation that makes businesses profitable. This has been especially
problematic for smaller companies, who may be deterred from taking
entrepreneurial risks. 77 Moreover, the enhanced auditing requirements
of Section 404 have strained relationships between clients and their
auditors. 78 Firms complain that overzealous auditors focus on irrelevant
minutiae, further wasting manager's time and the shareholders'
money.

79

In a speech made before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
Representative Barney Frank spoke of making legislative changes to the

73. Goelzer, supra note 62, at 5-6.
74. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §7262(a)(Supp. 2006)).
75. Kara Scannell, Moving the Market: Costs Fall Again for Firms To Comply With Sarbanes,
WALL ST. J., May 16, 2007, at C.3. "Total compliance costs in 2006, the third year companies
have had to follow the new rules, fell 23% ... from the prior year. That is 35% lower than the
first year .
I..."
Id; see also Borrus, supra note 68, at 126-28 (noting many of the technical and
administrative advances triggered by compliance with section 404).
76. Joe DosSantos, Master Data Management as a Compliance Solution, SEC INDUS. NEWS,
June 18, 2007 ("Corporations appear to be spending more time and money on regulatory
compliance now than at any time in recent history.").
77. Peter Ferola, The Role of Audit Committees in the Wake of Corporate Federalism:
Sarbanes-Oxley's Creep Into State Corporate Law, 7 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 143, 160 (2007).
78. Id. ("The new rules with respect to audit committees may have created an adversarial
model of corporate governance where the committee is placed in the position of second-guessing
the CEO and CFO as well as the company's auditors.").
79. Id.
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Act if necessary. 80
However, SEC chairman Christopher Cox
concluded that no legislative changes are necessary. 8 1 For now, it
seems that the only changes will be in the way the Act is implemented
82
or interpreted.
In the years immediately after SOX's enactment, the SEC provided
no guidance for managers with respect to complying with Section 404.83
On June 20, 2007, however, the SEC responded to the business
community's concerns about the costs of 404 by issuing interpretive
guidance 84 that the SEC's deputy chief accountant says is not a
retrenchment of Section 404.85 The SEC's deputy chief accountant
described the principles on which the SEC's interpretive guidance is
based, stating:
The first principle is that management should evaluate whether it has
implemented controls that adequately address the risk that a material
misstatement in the financial statements would not be prevented or
detected in a timely manner.
The second principle is that
management's evaluation of evidence about the
operation of its
86
risk.
of
assessment
its
on
based
be
should
controls
In other words, the SEC advises managers to focus on the risk that
financial statements will contain material inaccuracies in order to
comply with Section 404.87
The SEC declined to provide more specific guidance, rules, or
examples because it wanted management to focus on the principle of

80. Robert Schroeder, Sarbanes-Oxley Fix Debated at Competition Summit, MARKET WATCH,
Mar. 14, 2007, available at http://www.marketwatch.com (search "Sarbanes-Oxley Fix
Debated").
81. Id. (covering the debates of SOX at a summit on American competitiveness).
82. Romano, supra note 36, at 1602. "Congressional repeal of SOX's corporate governance
mandates is not on the near-term political horizon. Officeholders would not want to be perceived
as revising rules that are supposed to diminish the likelihood of corporate accounting scandals."
Id.
83. See John W. White, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin. U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Statement by
SEC Staff: SEC's Proposed Interpretive Guidance to Management for Section 404 of SarbanesOxley Act (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spchO52307jww
.htm (providing interpretive guidance regarding SOX).
84. Rules and Related Matters, SEC NEWS DIG., June 21, 2007, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/2007/dig062107.txt.
85. Zoe -Vonna Palmrose, Deputy Chief Accountant, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Statement
by SEC Staff: SEC's Proposed Interpretive Guidance to Management for Section 404 of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/
spch052307zvp.htm [hereinafter Palmrose SEC Statement].
86. Id.
87. Commission Announcements, SEC NEWS DIG., May 24, 2007.
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risk and how it operates at a manager's particular company. 88 A list of
specific rules, standards, or examples would inspire managers to take an
approach under Section 404 that would have them simply checking off
items on an articulated checklist. 89 Under this approach, managers
focus on form rather than substance or principles, which may require
managers to consider items on a checklist that are not relevant to their
firms and the risk that their firms' financial statements may be
materially misleading. 90 The SEC's principles-based implementation of
Section 404 is aimed at avoiding this type of inefficiency. SEC
Chairman Christopher Cox predicted that principles-based compliance,
focusing on the risk of material financial9 1 misstatements, will be
particularly beneficial for smaller companies.
Compliance costs should decrease because the new SEC guidance
developed specifically for management will allow each small business
to exercise significant judgment in designing an evaluation method that
is tailored to its individual circumstances. Unlike external auditors,
management in a smaller company tends to work with its internal
controls on a daily basis. They have significant knowledge about how
their firm operates. The new SEC guidance allows management to
which should lead to a much more
make use of that knowledge,
92
process.
assessment
efficient
The changing focus on Section 404 takes aim at the check-the-box
approach that managers have previously taken:
We're re-orienting 404 to focus on what truly matters to investorsand away from expensive and unproductive make-work procedures
that waste investors' money and distract attention from what's
No longer will the 404 process tolerate
genuinely material.
procedures performed solely 93so someone can claim he considered
every conceivable possibility.
88.

Id. "In adopting the revisions [to 404's interpretation] ... regulators said small companies,

in particular, should benefit by being able to focus audits on financial records that appeared to
present the greatest risks of fraud." Robert Schroeder, Regulators asked for Sarbanes-Oxley
costs, MARKETWATCH,

June 12, 2007, available at http://www.marketwatch.com

(search

"Regulators asked for Sarbanes").
89. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (describing the "check-the-box" approach
to SOX and the drawbacks of such an approach).
90. Palmrose SEC Statement, supra note 85.
91. Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Testimony Concerning Section
404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Small Business (June 5, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/tsO60507cc.htm.
92.

Id.

93. Id. Under the new guidelines corporate managers have more flexibility in preparing
financial reports because the new guidance does not require "every financial control to be
checked." Robert Schroeder, Further Tweaks Urgedfor Sarbanes-Oxley, MARKETWATCH, Feb.
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The PCAOB coordinated with the SEC to make changes to the way
auditors comply with Section 404 that are similar to the changes made
under the Commission's 404 interpretive guidance for corporate
management. 9 4 Auditing Standard No. 5 has replaced the original
internal control auditing standard articulated in Auditing Standard No.
2.95 The new standard for auditors, similar to the interpretive guidance
given to management, incorporates a principles-based approach that
focuses on the risk that a particular company's financial statement
would contain material misinformation. 96 This approach, like the
approach to be taken by management, allows auditors to customize their
97
audits according to the significant risks of a particular company.
Consequently, auditing costs for smaller, less complex companies will
not be unreasonably high because auditors will not spend time
investigating details that are not related to the risk of disclosure
inaccuracies for that company. Auditors are now encouraged to use
"professional judgment in the 404 process, particularly in using riskassessment" and in "determining when and to what extent the auditor
98
can use the work of others."
VII. CONCLUSION
Will the newly articulated principles-based approach that focuses on
risk assessment lower the costs of section 404 compliance while
protecting investors? With respect to lowering costs, some observers
argue that little will change because auditors and managers will
continue to focus on details and minutiae in order to avoid liability for
26, 2007, available at http://www.marketwatch.com (search "Further Tweaks Urged for
Sarbanes-Oxley").
94. Press Release, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Board Approves New Audit
Standard For Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and, Separately, Recommendations on
Inspection Frequency Rule (May 24, 2007), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/
News and Events/News/2007/05-24.aspx.
95. Id. Auditing Standard No. 5 is entitled "An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements" while Auditing Standard
No. 2 was the previous, more rules-based internal control standard. Id.
96. Id.
97. Robert Schroeder, Accounting Board OKs Streamlined Sarbanes-Oxley Checks,
MARKETWATCH, May 24, 2007, available at http://www.marketwatch.com (search "Accounting
Board OKs Streamlined"). Interestingly, "[tihe new standard is a third the length of the old one."
Id.
98. Commission Announcements: SEC Commissioners Endorse Improved Sarbanes-Oxley
Implementation to Ease Smaller Company Burdens, Focusing Effort on 'What Truly Matters,'
SEC NEWS DIG., April 4, 2007; see also Robert Schroeder, SEC agrees to coordinate auditing
proposals, MARKETWATCH, Apr. 4, 2007, available at http://www.marketwatch.com (search
"SEC Agrees to Coordinate Auditing Proposals") (further discussing the restructuring of the
auditing standards).
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noncompliance. 9 9

As one commentator notes, "'Simply proclaiming

that audits should be risk-based won't make them so ....

Auditors and

companies will still face potential liability for not looking at every last
process that could be deemed an internal control."' 10 0 In addition, as far
are
as investor protection is concerned, standards and principles
01
meaningless unless auditors and managers apply them faithfully. 1
One member of Britain's Financial Services Authority offered an
He stated,
interesting perspective on principles-based regulation.
"There are ...

rules. But you can afford to be less intrusive because as

a regulator, you have principles you can fall back on."' 1 2 This,
however, is easier than it sounds. Britain's Financial Services Authority
announced a "simple principle saying financial firms must segregate
their clients' money from their own money. Lawyers representing the
financial firms [asked]: "What do you mean by clients? What do you
mean by money? What do you mean by segregated?"
One commentator worried that focusing on principles rather than
hard and fast rules would make the proponents of principles-based
regulation seem "soft" on corporate malfeasance. 10 3 This is a problem,
however, only if corporate management is permitted to ignore one of
the most fundamental principles that inspired the enactment of SOX.
The principle is that ethical business, accounting, and disclosure
practices, and diligent oversight aimed at achieving these goals, will
inspire an ethical corporate culture in which corporate malfeasance is
infrequent. Emphasis on the admittedly broad principles of ethical
compliance and monitoring, and the clearly articulated demand and
expectation that managers behave ethically, will reduce risks and
protect investors.

99. Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 58, at 8-9.
100. Carol E. Curtis, No Rest for the Weary Regulator or Compliance Officer: Hedge Funds
Face Likely Scrutiny, But Small Companies, At Least, Get Relief, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, Jan. 8,
2007, at 16 (quoting John Berlau, director of the Center for Entrepreneurship at the Competitive
Enterprise Institute).
101. A member of PCAOB acknowledged that principles-based standards must be faithfully
applied. Schroeder, supra note 97.
102. Crawford Panel on a Single Canadian Securities Regulator, Issue Analysis: Growing
Support for Principles-BasedSecurities Regulation, http://www.crawfordpanel.ca/
3_IssuesAnalysis-PrinciplesBasedRegulation.doc.
103. Alan Murray, Paulson Walks Fine Line Amid Calls for a Less-Intrusive Regulatory
Scene, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2006, at A2.

